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                                                        Abstract    
This paper presents an econometric study dealing with household demand in Sweden. 
The main objective is to empirically examine the differences in consumer reaction to the 
introduction of, or the change, in environmental taxes. Main focus is on environmental 
taxes as a signaling device. The hypothesis is that the introduction of an environmental 
tax provides new information about the properties of the directly taxed goods. This in 
turn may affect consumer preferences for these goods, hence altering the consumption 
choice. The result from the econometric analysis shows that all goods have negative 
own-price elasticities, and positive income elasticities. Concerning the signalling effect 
of environmental taxes the results are somewhat ambiguous. The tax elasticity for 
energy goods used for heating seems to be significantly higher than the traditional price 
elasticity, whereas the opposite seems to be the case for energy goods used for 
transportation.      
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1. Introduction 
The main objective of this paper is to empirically examine consumer reactions as a 
response to the introduction of, or the change in, environmental taxes for different 
groups of commodities. Understanding consumer response to environmental taxes for 
different commodities is believed to be critical to the environmental policy makers.  
One of the premises implied in this study is that the changes in consumer prices, as a 
result of changes in environmental taxes, may send a different signal to the consumer 
compared with other changes in consumer prices, such as changes in producer price. In 
addition, this assumed difference in the signalling effect of the changes in 
environmental taxes, compared to changes in the producer price, may also differ 
between different commodities (Berkhout, Carbonell and Muskens, 2004).
1  
Over the last decade and, particularly, after the framework Convention on Climate 
Change of 1992, many OECD countries have considered the introduction of “Green Tax 
Reforms” aimed at reducing the emission of green house gases. The reduction is usually 
used to measure the effectiveness of environmental taxes (OECD, 2000). OECD (2003) 
emphasizes the need for more research that examines the magnitude of the behavioral 
response of consumers to environmental taxes once they have been introduced. Such 
behavioral response is considered to be a necessary precondition for the correct 
implementation of different instruments of any environmental policy. For a better 
understanding of this behavioral response, it is essential to empirically examine 
consumer reactions to the introduction of, or change in, environmental taxes on different 
categories of commodities. 
Behavioral response to environmental taxes can be estimated ex ante (predicted value) 
or ex post (actual values). The latter approach concentrates on the absolute reduction in 
consumption caused by the introduction or the increase of an environmental tax in a 
specific country at a specific time (Agnolucci, 2004). The ex ante approach uses 
econometric methods to estimate price elasticities, which, with precaution, are used to 
                                                             
1 The signalling effect may not be due to the tax change itself, but rather the tax change comes in a 
combination with information and campaigns, which alters consumer preferences. For an analytical 
analysis of the signalling effect in tax policy, see for example, Barigozzi and Villeneuve  (2004).     3
predict behavioural responses to environmental taxes (Garcia-Cerruti, 2000; Halvorsen 
and Larsen, 2001). 
In this paper, we formulate and estimate an econometric model for non-durable 
consumer demand in Sweden that utilises macro data. The system of demand equations 
is derived assuming cost-minimising households. The employed model is essentially a 
three-stage budgeting model with aggregate data from the Swedish National Accounts. 
In the first stage it is assumed that the household determines how much to spend on 
non-durable goods and how much to spend on durable goods (including savings). In the 
second stage it is assumed that the household allocates its total expenditure for non-
durable goods on different non-durable commodity aggregates, or groups. Given the 
allocation on each non-durable commodity group, households in the third stage allocate 
their group expenditures on the various goods within the group. Our model is based on 
Deaton & Muellbauer’s (1980) almost ideal model (AIDS).  
Specific in our modelling approach is the hypothesis of taxes as a signalling device. To 
account for this the consumer price is divided into a producer price part and a tax part. 
Given this partition, it enables us to estimate separate effects; a producer price effect 
and a tax effect. We also want to conduct tests of structural stability of the demand 
system for the entire sample period. It is important to check the stability of the model, 
since if it is unstable, it will be difficult to interpret the regression results. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate the design and 
purpose of the energy and environmental taxes introduced in Sweden. Section 3 
describes the demand system, the data, as well as the estimation and test approach. 
Section 4 discusses the results. Finally in Section 5 we draw some conclusions.  
2. Energy and environmental  taxation in Sweden. 
Environmental effects caused by energy generation and consumption are significant 
because of the widespread use of fossil fuels in the economic system. The magnitude of 
these effects is of concern, particularly in the case of climate change, but also due to 
other external costs related to fossil fuel use.   4
Sweden has used taxes on energy since 1929, when a tax on gasoline was introduced. 
Electricity has been taxed since 1951, followed by a broadening of energy taxes in 
1957. The motivation underlying these taxes was purely fiscal. Propelled by the global 
energy crisis in the 1970s; energy taxes were increasingly motivated by a desire to 
discourage consumption of fossil fuels. Thus, increased tax on oil products were 
coupled with a significant expansion of electricity supply in order to promote a different 
profile of energy consumption. 
In the eighties, environmental concerns entered the discussion, manifested by the 
introduction of a tax differentiation of leaded gasoline in 1986. This was followed by 
the Environmental Tax Commission that recommended a rich array of environmental 
taxes in their proposal. New primarily environmental taxes, introduced in the 1991 tax 
reform, include a carbon dioxide tax on fossil fuel, and a sulfur tax on coal and oil. In 
addition, the VAT has been extended to all fuels, and a nitrogen dioxide tax is charged 
on emissions from large combustion plants (Brännlund and Kriström, 1997). Another 
green tax reform was discussed with the appointment of the Swedish “Green Tax 
Commission” (SOU 1997:11). The Green Tax Commission’s main objective was to 
analyze the potential of fiscally neutral green tax reforms. The prospects in mind were 
that there may exist a “double dividend” (Brännlund and Nordström, 1999).
2 
This idea of a green tax swap was decided upon during spring 2000. It was decided that 
a switch from taxes on labour to environmental taxation amounting to 30 billion SEK 
will be carried out during the following 10 years. The main taxes considered are the 
CO2 tax and the energy tax on electricity.  
The development of the general energy tax, as a share of consumer price, is displayed 
Figure 1. Here we can see that the tax on oil for heating has increased from 
approximately 10% of the consumer price in 1980, to approximately 50% in 2002. The 
tax on electricity shows a similar pattern.  
 
                                                             
2 The “double dividend” will not be discussed in this work. For a review of this issue, see for example, 
Bovenberg (1999) and Schöb (2003). 
 








































Figure1. Energy tax as a share of total price in Sweden, 1980-2002. 
3. The model 
In this section we formulate the demand system for non-energy and energy goods. We 
assume that consumers follow a three-stage budgeting process. In the first stage, the 
household decides on its leisure consumption, savings and investments (durable 
consumer goods).  In the second stage, the household determines, given its total budget, 
how much to spend on food, heating, transports, and other goods. In the third stage, the 
household allocates resources within each of these groups. For, example, given a 
specific amount of money to be spent on transports, the household determine how much 
that should be allocated to expenditure on gasoline, car maintenance, and public and 
other transport. In the same manner the household determines in the third stage how to 
use its budget for heating. In this case the household can choose between electricity for 
heating, oil for heating or district heating. Our main objective is to model and estimate 
household choices in the second and third stage, with particular reference to energy 
taxes.  
Demand function estimates are also very useful as they provide us with income and 
price elasticities. Consumers response to income and changes is required for the design 
of many different policies; For example, policy design for indirect taxation and 
subsidies requires knowledge of the response for taxable commodities and services 
(Deaton, 1980). Such knowledge would normally be obtained by the analysis of time 
series data on demand of commodities, prices, and income.   6
We use the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), first derived by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980). The advantages of this system are well known. It gives an arbitrary 
first order approximation to any demand system, satisfies the axioms of choice exactly, 
and is simple to estimate. 
The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) assumes that consumer preferences fall 
within the PIGLOG (price-independent generalized logarithmic) class so that exact 
aggregation over consumers is possible. In the AIDS model the budget share on a 
specific commodity, or group of commodities, in relation to full expenditure, can be 
written as: 
) / ln( ln P Y p w i j j ij i i β γ α + + = ∑                                                                                 (1) 
where  wi is the budget share for good i,  j p is the price for good j ,  Y is total 
expenditure on non-durable goods, P is the consumer price index, and the parameters to 
be estimated are α, γ, and β. The consumer price index, P, is defined as Stone’s price 
index, which is expressed as: 
                                                                                                        (2)  
In order to analyse the difference in the signalling effect of the changes in 
environmental taxes compared to changes in the producer price, we have to separate the 
consumer price into a producer price part and energy tax part: 
j j j p p τ ⋅ =   
                                     (3) 
where  j p  is the consumer price index for energy good j,  j p  the producer price index 
for energy good j, and  j τ  is the energy tax index, which represents the environmental  
tax for specific good. The energy tax index has been calculated by dividing the observed 
consumer price index on observed producer price index, which can be represented by 
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Allowing for a difference in signalling effects, equation (1) can now be written as: 




ij i i β τ γ γ α + + + = ∑ ∑                (5) 
The budget share equation (5) includes two parameters representing the consumer price, 
the first one,  ij γ , is the coefficient for the producer price index and the other,  ij γ ~ , is the 
coefficient for energy taxes index. In this case we can capture the effect of energy taxes 
on the consumer behaviour and see if there is any difference between the parameters of 
energy taxes and the parameters of producer price. 
To obtain consistent estimates we have to assume that under multi-stage budgeting the 
direct utility function is weakly separable. This approach implies that goods can be 
divided into a number of separate groups, where a change of the price of a good in one 
group affects the demand for all goods in another group in the same manner. 
If we have a three-stage budgeting process, the first stage comprises of allocation 
between durables and non-durables goods. In the second stage, the household allocates 
its total expenditure between n groups of goods. In the third stage, the household 
allocates its expenditure between m goods within each of the n groups. Given this 
structure, the Linear Ideal Demand System (LAIDS) model can be written in stochastic 
form as: 
() () () ()
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where  n r ,..., 1 =  denotes group,  ) ( ,..., 1 r m i = denotes commodities within group r, and 
T t ,..., 1 =  denotes time period. Equation (6) thus describes the allocation between 
groups, where w(r)t denotes the budget share for good r in period t,  t r p ) (  is a group   8
producer price index, xt is total expenditure on non-durables,  t r) ( τ  is the group energy 
taxation index, and  t P  finally is the consumer price index for non-durables. Equation 
(7) describes allocation within the rth group, where  () it r w  is the within group budget 
share,  () j r p ln  is the producer price index of the jth good, x(r)t is the total expenditure 
allocated to the rth group,  jt r) ( τ  is the energy taxation index of  goods j within group r , 
and p(r)t is the stone price index for the rth group. 
 
Given estimates of the parameters at each “level”, we can calculate price and 
expenditure elasticities, totally and conditional on the expenditures for each group 
(Edgerton et al. 1996)
3. Using the main group notation the expenditure and 
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where Er denotes the expenditure elasticity for group r, ers the uncompensated producer 
price elasticity, and  rs e ~  the uncompensated energy taxation elasticity,  rs δ  equals one 
when  s r = , and zero otherwise. 
Let us denote the expenditure elasticity for the ith good within the rth group of goods as 
() i r E . The group expenditure elasticity for the rth group of goods as E(r), and the total 
expenditure elasticity for the ith good within the rth group of goods, i E , is then defined 
as : 
() () i r r i E E E =                                  (11) 
In the same way, we can denote the within group price elasticity between the ith and jth 
goods within the rth group of goods as () ij r e , the group price elasticity as  () () s r e  and the 
                                                             
3 The model is estimated without any homogeneity, and symmetry restrictions.   9
total price elasticties as ij e . We can notice that the within group price elasticity assumes 
that group expenditure is unchanged in spite of the price change, whilst the total price 
elasticity allows for the relevant changes in group expenditure. 
 
Finally we can denote the equivalent total price elasticity as 
() () () () () ( ) s r rs j s i r ij r rs ij e w E e e + + = δ δ                            (12) 
If we look at equation (12) for two goods within the same group, we can see that the 
total price elasticity consists of two components. The first part is a direct effect, which 
represents the subgroup elasticity, while the second part is an indirect effect, which is a 
product of three factors. The first measure the relative change in the group price index 
when the price of the jth good change (this is equal to () j r w ), the second factor measures 
the effect a change in the price index has on the group expenditure () () ( ) s r e + 1,  w h i l e  t h e  
third factor measures the effect this change in within group expenditure has on the 
consumption of the ith good  () ( ) i r E . 
We can also notice that if the own between group price elasticity () () 1 − = r r e , then the 
group expenditure is unaffected by the price change and () ij r ij e e = . On the other hand, 
if () () 0 = r r e , then the price change produce a proportional effect on the group 
expenditure.  
The model specified above will be estimated using time series data on Swedish 
consumption of non-durable goods from 1980 to 2002. Energy tax data are then linked 
to each type of good within the heating and transportation group. 
Since the data spans over a relative long period we conduct tests of structural stability of 
the demand system for the entire sample period. The usual practice in assessing the 
constancy of regression coefficients over time it is to use prior information concerning 
the true point of structural change in the nature of regression relationship. The 
researcher identifies an event that is hypothesized to cause structural change, estimates 
separate regression, and examines whether the multiple sets of estimated coefficients are   10
significantly different from each other using an F-test. This is the so-called Chow test. 
An alternative procedure is to estimate the model over the full sample period with one 
or more dummy variables. One drawback of Chow tests is the maintained assumption 
that the sample variances are equal in both time periods. An alternative, suggested by 
Hansen (1992), is the Wald test that does not impose this restriction. 
It is important to note that both of these approaches require prior information regarding 
the event that is alleged to cause the structural change. One approach which does not 
require prior information concerning the true point of structural change is to conduct a 
series of Chow tests for each time period. An attractive property of these 1-step Chow 
tests is that they allow the data to identify when the true point of structural change 
occurs. A related approach is that of Brown, Durbin, and Evans (1975) (CUSUMSQ 
test). In this case, an analysis of the cumulative sum of squared residuals from the 
regression determines, if at all, structural (break) or shift occurs. These tests have been 
employed on time series data to analyse the demand for money (see Heller and Khan 
1979), and aggregate output fluctuations (see McConnel and Perez-Quiros, 2000). In 
our context, we will use CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests and the null hypothesis of these 
tests is that the demand system coefficients are constant over the time period. 
4. Description of the data 
The data set employed consist of aggregate time series over Swedish consumption 
of non-durable goods, and energy taxes linked to each type of good within the heating 
and transportation group covering the years 1980-2002. Our demand system is 
composed of expenditure on the following four main consumption groups; Foodstuff, 
transports, heating, and other goods. Expenditures on each of these groups are divided 
into individual goods as follows: 
1.  Foodstuff : expenditure on food and beverages. 
2.  Transport: expenditure on petrol,  car maintenance, and public and other 
transport. 
3.  Heating: expenditure on electricity, district heating, and oil.   11
4.  Other goods: expenditure on clothes,  health care,  recreation,  domestic 
appliances and other. 
The estimation of household demand for the main groups (equations (6)) requires the 
following prices: general price index ( t P ), producer price index for each group ( t s p ) ( ), 
and a energy tax index ( ) )( ( s r τ ) for heating and transportation. The general price index 
is calculated using equation (2). The energy tax index for heating is defined as: 
  ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( oil oil dis dis el el he w w w τ τ τ τ + + = , 
where el w , dis w , and  oil w  are weights representing the budget share for electricity, 
district heating, and oil. The energy tax index for transportation is defined in a similar 
way, where pe w , and  pub w  are the budget share for petrol and public and other transport. 
Information on all the necessary weights is available from our data. Finally, we can use 
equation (3) to calculate the producer price index for the heating and transportation 
groups since we have consumer price indexes from our data and energy tax indexes as 
described above. 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 contain summary statistics for the consumption data for the four 
main groups, and for the individual types of energy goods. 
As can be seen in Figure 2 consumption of “transports” and “heating”, measured as 
expenditure shares, have been fairly stable over the period, although there is a weak 
positive trend in the heating share. The “food” share, however, has decreased strongly, 
whereas “other goods” has increased. Since income has increased over this time period, 
the pattern in Figure 2 indicates that “food” is a necessary good, whereas “other goods” 
is a luxury.
4 In Figure 4 we see that about 85 percent of total household expenditure on 
heating during the sample period is used on electricity and oil. Furthermore it can be 
seen that there has been a substantial substitution from the use of oil towards electricity 
during the same period. 
                                                             
























































Figure 4. Expenditure shares, within transportation group.   13
 
 
5. Estimation and empirical results 
Following the specification in equations (6) and (7), the demand system for the main 
groups and for the goods within the main groups is estimated by OLS. Table A1-A5 in 
the Appendix, gives the estimates of the parameters of the model. The results indicate 
that most of the estimated parameters are significantly different from zero, and that the 
degree of explanation is good.  
Based on the results from Tables A1-A5, we try to address two issues before calculating 
the own-price and expenditure elasticities. The first is to test if the parameters that 
represent the producer price and energy taxation are equal or not. The result from this 
test is presented in Table 1. According to the results, the null hypothesis of equality 
between the producer price and energy tax is rejected for every energy good except for 
the transport group and oil.
5 
Table 1. F-test of parameter equality. 
Goods  F-test  The null hypothesis : 
ij ij γ γ =  
Heating 13.5*  Reject 
Transport  0.49  Do not reject 
Petrol   7.4*  Reject 
Other transportation  52.5*  Reject 
Electricity 31.8*  Reject 
District Heating  52.8*  Reject 
Oil  0.65  Do not reject 
Note: * significant at the 5% level. 
 
The second issue is related to parameter stability in the demand system. If the model is 
unstable it will be difficult to interpret the regression results. Since a parametric 
econometric model is completely described by its parameters, model stability is 
equivalent to parameter stability (see Chan and Lee, 1997). We rely on the CUSUM and 
                                                             
5 To calculate the F-test, we first estimate the unrestricted model (equation (6) for the main groups, or 
equation (7) for the goods within the main groups). In the estimation of the restricted model we include an 
equality constraint on the own-price parameter and the own-tax parameter, i.e. there is one restriction in 
each equation.   14
CUSUMSQ tests of Brown et al. (1975). The tests are applied to the residuals of each 
main group in equation (6). The CUSUM test is based on the cumulative sum of 
recursive residuals. It is updated recursively and is plotted against the time. If the plot of 
CUSUM statistic stays within 5% significance level (portrayed by two straight lines 
whose equations are given in Brown et al., 1975), then coefficient estimates are said to 
be stable. A similar procedure is used to carry out the CUSUMSQ which is based on the 
squared recursive residuals.  In general, if the CUSUM or CUSUMSQ move outside the 
critical lines of 5% significance level, the null hypothesis will be rejected, meaning that 
the model is unstable.  
As can be seen from Appendix B, the plot of CUSUM statistic stays within the critical 
lines indicating stability in demand model. On the other hand, the plot of CUSUMSQ 
test moves outside the critical lines of 5 % significance level in the transport and other 
goods groups but remain within the critical lines of 10 % significance level. 
Accordingly, there is evidence supporting a stability hypothesis of the demand system..  
Now we can use the estimated parameters to calculate the elasticities. These elasticities 
depend on the values of prices, energy taxes and total expenditure at which they are 
evaluated. Here we evaluate the elasticities at the sample mean for the period 1980-
2002. Given the estimated parameters, the expenditure and price elasticities can be 
calculated according to (8), (9), (10), (11), and (12). The resulting elasticities are 
presented in Table 2.   15











Foodstuff -0.11  0.26     
Heating -0.07  0.61    
Heating tax  -0.36
*      
Transport -0.17  0.53     
Transport tax  -0.20       
Other goods  -0.84  1.50     
FOODSTUFF 
Food -0.78  0.79  -0.31  0.21 
Beverages -0.98  1.43  -0.57  0.38 
HEATING 
Electricity -0.61  0.75  -0.14  0.46 
Electricity tax  -1.80
*   -1.40   
District heating  -0.43  1.92  -0.08  1.18 
District heating tax  -1.83
*   -1.59   
Oil -0.99  1.04  -0.86  0.64 
Oil tax  -1.58
*   -1.49   
   T RANSPORTS 
Petrol -0.71  0.72  -0.45  0.32 
Petrol tax  -0.46    -0.21   
Car maintenance  -0.99  1.53  -0.49  0.82 
Public and other transp  -0.55  0.49  -0.47  0.26 
Public and other transp tax  -0.76    -0.69   
OTHER 
Clothes -1.29  0.72  -1.27  1.12 
Other goods  -0.81  1.03  -0.73  1.60 
Health care  -0.23  0.64  -0.23  0.90 
Recreation -0.87  1.33  -0.84  2.06 
Domestic appl.  -1.58  1.05  -1.56  1.60 
Note: 
* the signalling effect is significant.  
 
From Table 2 we can notice that all expenditure and own-price elasticities have the 
expected signs. The expenditure elasticities indicate that food, heating and 
transportation are necessities, whereas other goods are luxuries. All own-price 
elasticities have a negative sign, meaning that a price increase will reduce demand for 
that good. 
Table 2 should be read in the following way. If the price of electricity increases by 10%, 
the demand for electricity decreases by 6.1%. But if the energy tax for electricity   16
increases by 10%, the demand for electricity is reduced by 18%. In other words, the 
energy tax for electricity has larger impact on consumer demand than the producer price 
of electricity. 
From this point of view, we can notice that Swedish consumers are more sensitive to 
energy taxes than producer price for most energy goods except petrol and public and 
other transport. It seems that a change in energy taxes for these goods have a smaller 
impact than a change in producer price for these goods. It should be noted that most of 
the own price elasticities are between 0 and -1, which implies that a higher price of one 
good increase its budget share in spite of lower consumption of that good. 
Also from Table 2, the total expenditure elasticities indicate that all goods in the within 
food, heating and transportation are necessities, i.e. these have total expenditure 
elasticities less than one. Within the “other goods” group, clothes, recreation, and 
domestic appliances are found to be luxuries, since they have total expenditure 
elasticities that are larger than one.  
Furthermore, the results in Table 2, show that the tax elasticities seem to be -in absolute 
value- higher than -1 for electricity, oil, and district heating. For these goods, higher 
energy taxes will lead to a relatively large reduction in consumption, but also a decrease 
in the budget share. From this point of view, we can say that the energy taxes may be 
efficient if the objective is to reduce emissions, but inefficient if the objective with the 
tax is strictly fiscal.  On the other hand, the tax elasticities for petrol and public and 
other transport is less than -1, meaning that if the tax increases on these goods, energy 
taxes will be more efficient from a fiscal point of view, at least in the short run.  
6. Conclusion and discussion  
One of the key issues in public policy in general, and perhaps in environmental policy 
in particular, is how consumers respond to changes in policy. In this paper the issue is 
how consumers respond to changes in taxation, in particular environmental taxation. 
The basic question posed is if the response to a price change depends on the source of 
the price change. The idea is to test if changes in the consumer price that results from 
the introduction, or change, in environmental taxes give a different signal to the   17
consumer, compared with changes in the consumer price that results only from a 
producer price change.  
To achieve the objectives a system of demand functions for Swedish households is 
estimated. To test for the signalling effect of environmental taxes the consumer price for 
energy goods is partitioned into a producer price part and a tax part. The results of the 
study show that changes in environmental taxes has a significant signalling effect on the 
demand for residential heating in the sense that the consumers are more sensitive to a 
tax change than a producer price change. For transports, however, the results show no 
significant difference. Concerning individual commodities within the main groups the 
results shows that the tax elasticity is higher (in absolute value) for all types of energy 
within heating (electricity, oil, district heating). Within transports, however, the results 
indicate the opposite, i.e. petrol consumption seems to be less sensitive to a tax change 
than to a change in the producer price. These results are then indicating that 
environmental policy, in the form of energy taxes, will be more effective in reducing 
pollution due to consumption of heating, but less effective in reducing pollution from 
transports.   
In this paper we use macro level time-series data for Swedish household expenditure. 
This may be one explanation to the somewhat ambiguous results concerning the 
signalling effect, i.e. we have not been able to control for long-run trends in petrol 
consumption affected by for example improvements in fuel efficiency. Furthermore, the 
aggregate nature of the data may be another explanation. It may be the case that there 
are large differences between different types of households, depending on family size, 
income level, place of residence, etc., which is not captured using macro data. Thus, 
using panel data to determine the difference in signalling effect at the specific level of 
household may be a better way to investigate this matter. Furthermore, one could also 
examine the effect of the “consistency” of environmental policy by estimating the above 
model for the first major introduction of the environmental tax, compared with the 
subsequent increases of the same tax. It may be the case that the signalling effect is 
“non-linear” in the sense that the signalling effect is stronger when the tax is introduced 
than for subsequent changes of the tax. However, this will be subject for future research.   
   18
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1:  Demand system parameter Estimates for the period 1980-2002 in the main 
group. 


















































































Table A2:  Demand system parameter Estimates for the period 1980-2002 in the food 
subgroup. 
 




















Table A3: Demand system parameter Estimates for the period 1980-2002 in the heating 
subgroup. 
 



































































Table A4: Demand system parameter Estimates for the period 1980-2002 in the  
Transport subgroup. 
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Table A5: Demand system parameter Estimates for the period 1980-2002 in the  
Other goods subgroup. 
 



























































































Note. t value are presented in the parenthesis.    22
Appendix B 
 


























                The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Figure B-1 : Cusum and Cusumsq test for food group. 
 




























                  The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Figure B-2: Cusum and  Cusumsq test for heating group 
              
 




























           The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
Figure B-3: Cusum and Cusumsq test for transport group 
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            The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
 
Figure B-4: Cusum and Cusumsq test for other goods  
 